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THE BASEL COMMITTEE’S PROPOSALS FOR REVISED CAPITAL
STANDARDS:  MARK 2 AND THE STATE OF PLAY
Andrew Cornford
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva
Abstract
The new 500-page consultative document on capital standards of the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS), “The New Basel Capital Accord”, gives what is likely to prove a reasonable idea
of the eventual shape of the new capital accord. However, many detailed issues remain to be resolved
before completion of the drafting process in 2002. The scale and duration of this process reflects both the
increasing complexity of banking operations and the role of the BCBS as the institution responsible for
globally applicable standards for banking regulation and supervision. The basic structure of the 2001
consultative document follows that of the June 1999 proposals, in particular three Pillars treating the
calculation of capital requirements, supervisory review, and the disclosure necessary for effective market
discipline. But the 2001 proposals are much more concrete and detailed.
In their present form the proposals of the New Accord raise several concerns likely to apply to all
countries but in some respects particularly to developing ones. One set of concerns relates to the New
Accord’s impact on supervisory divergences among countries, cross-border competition between banks,
and cooperation between national supervisors. The New Accord has been crafted to accommodate banks
of very different levels of sophistication. Yet this may compromise its basic objective of enhancing
competitive equality by actually creating regulatory divergences in some areas of banking practice both
within and between different countries. As a result the difficulties of achieving effective cross-border
cooperation amongst supervisors may well increase. A second set of concerns involves the relation of the
New Accord to ongoing exercises involving codes and standards. Here the key standard is the BCBS’s
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision for which the capital adequacy requirements of the
Basle Capital Accord provide the principal benchmark. The New Accord will represent a quantum
increase  in  the  complexity of supervisors’ responsibilities in most countries, and the resulting
administrative  burden  will  be  aggravated  by  its  incorporation  in  assessment  exercises  regarding
compliance with the key standards. Furthermore, the link between the New Accord and key standards for
financial systems also implies that implementation will become a subject for IMF Article IV surveillance
and part of the conditionality associated with the IMF’s new CCL facility. A further set of issues involves
possible effects on regulatory arbitrage, since the comprehensiveness and detailed character of the rules
of the New Accord will almost inevitably be a source of new opportunities for such arbitrage. Finally,
there are concerns as to the effects of the New Accord on economic activity and international capital
flows. The proposed risk weights of the IRB approach would lead to substantial rises in interest rates for
lending to borrowers with low credit ratings both within countries and internationally – rises likely to
affect borrowers from several developing countries. Moreover, owing to their links to the ratings of credit
rating agencies and to observed default rates, the risk weights proposed in the New Accord are capable
of contributing to the pro-cyclical character of bank lending both within countries and across borders,
since they would be likely to translate higher credit risks in more difficult times into increased capital
requirements (and thus more restrictive lending policies). Prudential rules which would minimize such
dangers can be sketched but would nonetheless be difficult to incorporate in the design of regulatory
systems.- 2 -
1 The full list of consultative documents issued in January 2001 is as follows: the core document, The New Basel
Capital Accord (133 pages), which is accompanied by a more summary statement, Overview of The New Basel
Capital Accord (37 pages), as well as a note resembling a press release, The New Basel Accord: An Explanatory
Note (12 pages), and seven more specialized supporting documents, The Standardised Approach to Credit Risk
(52 pages), The Internal Ratings-Based Approach (102 pages), Pillar 2 (Supervisory Review Process) (14 pages),
Pillar 3 (Market Discipline) (59 pages), Principles for the Management and Supervision of Interest Rate Risk (39
pages), Operational Risk (26 pages), and Asset Securitisation (28 pages). The different documents in this package
are referred to by their titles in the sequel and are not included in the References at the end of the paper.
2 The definitive version of the new Accord was to have been published at the end of 2001, but this deadline has
been extended to the end of 2002. The target date for implementation is 2005.
I.  INTRODUCTION
The new, nine-part, 500-page consultative document on capital standards of the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (BCBS), issued in January 2001, gives what is likely to prove a reasonable idea
of the eventual shape of the new capital accord.
1 However, the paper is still a report of work in progress
and many detailed issues remain to be resolved during the last lap of the drafting process, which is to be
completed in 2001.
2 The scale and duration of this process reflect partly the increasing complexity of
banking operations, but also the role of the BCBS as the institution responsible for globally applicable
standards for banking regulation and supervision. At the time of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord no such
role was assumed, and the Accord was directed at the internationally active banks of the BCBS’s
member countries. But during the decade which followed its application was extended much more widely
to other jurisdictions and banks. Several factors contributed to this extension, such as the closely parallel
regulatory initiatives of the EEC/EU, the BCBS’s own proselytizing of other supervisors and supervisory
groups, and the internationalization of banking itself since the granting of the market access to foreign
banks has become widely conditional on the standards of the regulatory regimes in their home countries
– standards for which the rules enunciated by the BCBS are now accepted as a model. Even among
developed countries the range of sophistication of banking firms is wide and this point applies a fortiori
to the international economy as a whole. The number of issues which the BCBS must confront has
become  correspondingly  greater,  and  the  consultation associated with its statements of standards
correspondingly more inclusive and lengthy.- 3 -
3 The  discussion of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord and of the 1999 proposal for a  New  Capital  Adequacy
Framework which follows draws heavily on two sources, Cornford (2000) and Matten (2000, Part Three). The latter
source  goes  beyond  commentators’  usual  concentration  on  legal  and  accounting  issues,  placing  banks’  regulatory
capital  squarely  in  the context of the other dimensions of capital management intended to achieve objectives of risk
control and economic performance.
4 Credit risk results from the possibility that a bank’s counterparty will default on its obligations.
5 Netting refers to the amalgamation of sums due to and from a bank for the purpose of estimating its net risk
exposure.  Such  netting  can  be  bilateral,  in  which  case  it  applies  to  the  mutual  obligations  of  the  counterparties, or
multilateral,  in  which  case  it  applies to the mutual obligations originating within a group of counterparties (net
amounts  due  being  settled  through  a  central  clearing  house).  So  long  as  they  are supported by appropriate legal
rules,  such  netting  arrangements can reduce banks’ risk exposure, and the BCBS’s role here has consisted in
specifying when such a reduction should be reflected in lower capital requirements for banks.
6 Market risk is that of loss due to changes in the market value of a bank’s assets before they can be liquidated
or offset in some way.
II.  THE FLAWS OF THE 1988 BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
3
The basic objectives of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord were to strengthen the international banking
system and to promote convergence of national capital standards, thus removing competitive inequalities
among banks resulting from differences on this front. Its key features were a common measure of
qualifying  capital,  a  common  framework  for  the  valuation  of  bank  assets  in  accordance with their
associated credit risks
4 (including those classified as off-balance-sheet), and a minimum level of capital
determined by a ratio of 8 per cent of qualifying capital to aggregate risk-weighted assets. In the following
years a series of amendments and interpretations were issued concerning various parts of the Accord:
these extended the definition and purview of qualifying capital, recognized the reductions in risk exposure
which  could  be achieved by bilateral netting
5  meeting  certain  conditions,  interpreted  the  Accord’s
application to multilateral netting schemes, allowed for the effects on risk exposure of collateralization with
securities issued by selected OECD public-sector entities, and reduced the risk weights for exposures to
regulated securities firms. Simultaneously, the BCBS continued its work on other banking risks of which
the main practical outcome was the amendment of the 1988 Accord to cover market risk
6 adopted in
1996. But the 1988 Capital Accord lacked explicit provisions for capital to cover banks’ interest-rate risks
not included under the heading of market risk and their operational risks.
From the moment when it was unveiled the 1988 Basel Capital Accord was the subject of criticism
which increased with the passage of time. The importance attributed to different weaknesses of the
Accord varied among the different countries and other parties affected. But three points were particularly
prominent in the criticisms: firstly, the Accord’s failure to make adequate allowance for the degree of
reduction in risk exposure achievable through diversification; secondly, the possibility that the Accord
would lead banks to restrict their lending (particularly if the new capital requirements were introduced in- 4 -
7 The  differentiation  of  sovereign  risk  in  the  1988 Accord between OECD and non-OECD countries (with the
attribution  of  lower  risk  weights  to  selected categories of entity in the former) was the subject of objections as to
its  unjustifiably  discriminatory  character  on  the  part  of  a  number  of developing countries. This differentiation was
the result of a political agreement within the BCBS, whose somewhat arbitrary character it acknowledged (Cornford,
2000: 10).
8 During the recent period the BCBS’s definition of a bank’s trading book consisted of its “proprietary positions
in financial instruments … intentionally held for short-term resale and/or … taken on by the bank with the intention
of  benefitting  in  the  short-term  from  actual  and/or expected differences between their buying and selling prices, or
from  other  price  or  interest-rate  variations,  and  positions  in  financial  instruments arising from matched principal
brokering and market making, or positions taken in order to hedge other elements of the trading book”. Its other
assets  and  off-balance-sheet  exposures  are classified as its banking book (BCBS, 1996, Introduction, sect. I).
Concerning  elaboration  of  the  definition  of  the  trading  book  in  the  2001  consultative  paper,  see  section  IV.L  below.
deflationary conditions characterized by downward pressure on their profits); and thirdly, its arbitrary and
undiscriminating calibration of credit risks.
7 The last point involved one of a number of features of the
Accord  which  led  to  regulatory  arbitrage  resulting  from  misalignments  between  regulatory  rules  and
economic incentives. In this case banks were tempted to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by
the Accord’s calibration of risk to increase their holdings of higher-yielding but also higher-risk assets for
a given level of regulatory capital. Other features of the Accord exploited for the purpose of regulatory
arbitrage are the possibilities that the Accord offers for reducing regulatory capital through rolling over
loans to banks in non-OECD countries to avoid maturities exceeding one year and (after 1996) through
shifting exposures from the banking to the trading book.
8
Another area of concern to both banks and their supervisors was the growing divergence between
the framework of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord and innovations affecting the management of credit risk.
Some of these innovations were concerned with the modelling of credit risk for the purpose of better
measurement and control. Others involved new techniques for the reduction or mitigation of such risk.
Of special importance here were credit derivatives, whose use expanded rapidly in the 1990s.
Stripped to their essentials, most credit derivatives are OTC transactions, structured as swaps,
options or embedded securities, under which one party (the seller of protection or buyer of risk) receives
a premium and in return enters into a commitment to provide the other party (the buyer of protection or
seller of risk) with a payment or transfer of value triggered by a specified deterioration in the performance
of a third party or parties (the Reference Entity or Entities) under specified debt or securities obligations
(Reference Obligations), or by changes in the creditworthiness of the Reference Entity or Entities (see,
for example, Henderson, 1999). The opportunities provided by credit derivatives for disaggregating and
transferring credit risk are used for various purposes such as the management of credit lines, reduction
of the capital required by regulation, the hedging and diversification of portfolios, and pure risk reduction
(Reoch, 1997).
Practices regarding regulation of these instruments have yet to become firmly established and are
still subject to significant variations at the national level. The key issues to be confronted by regulators- 5 -
9 For  more  concrete  description  of  standards  of financial reporting by Asian banks at the time of the region’s
financial  crisis  by  an  observer  on  the  spot  professionally  involved  in  the  rating  of  banks  see  Delhaise  (1998,
especially chap. 3).
include whether particular contracts should be part of the banking or trading book, the treatment of the
underlying  Reference  Entities  or  Reference  Obligations,  and  the  treatment  of  the  counterparty  risk
associated with the derivative itself  (Kasapi, 1999, chap. 7). The rules adopted in some jurisdictions have
had the result that a bank buying credit protection through a credit derivative may actually be faced with
an increase in regulatory capital even where the transaction has led to a reduction in its risk owing to the
lack of a sufficiently close match between the hedging instrument and the underlying exposure (Matten,
2000: 124–125). Moreover owing to lack of regulatory uniformity the trading of credit derivatives is
another area providing opportunities for regulatory arbitrage (Tavakoli, 1998: 237).
The financial crises of the 1990s drew attention to the ineffectiveness of the 1988 Basel Capital
Accord on its own as an instrument for the achievement of banking stability and to incentives which it
provided  to  categories of lending generally believed to have contributed to countries’ financial
vulnerability. With respect to these issues the concerns regarding, as well as the concerns of, developing
countries achieved much greater prominence. There was of course always awareness of the dependence
of  the  different  elements  of regulatory frameworks for banking on the quality of supervisory
implementation and on the extent to which the framework’s standards were incorporated into the norms
of the banking sector’s operations and management. And both sorts of dependence were known to be
crucially linked to financial reporting and accounting practices, subjects classified under the heading of
“transparency”, on which both supervisors and lenders and investors rely for the satisfactory performance
of their responsibilities. But the financial crises of the 1990s in emerging-market countries underlined the
importance of these factors with a vengeance. In some of the Asian countries affected by the region’s
crisis, for example, capital standards based on the model of the 1988 Basel Accord had been or were
being introduced but provided little protection to banking systems owing to poor accounting standards and
weak supervision.
9 The exercise which led to the issuance of the BCBS’s Core Principles for Effective
Banking Supervision in 1997 is intended to be a remedy for such supervisory weaknesses but there is
also a widespread belief that the supervisory prerequisites for effective capital regulation should be an
explicit part of future international initiatives in this area. And there has been a similar feeling about the
need for more explicit recognition of the role of transparency.
As to the contribution of international bank lending to recent crises in emerging markets attention
is often drawn to the tendency for countries affected to manifest a high level of dependence on short-term
borrowing.  Since  this  dependence  may  reflect  creditors’ deteriorating confidence in a borrower’s
creditworthiness, the autonomous contribution of short-term borrowing to a financial crisis may be difficult
to identify. Nevertheless, short-term borrowing sometimes becomes a major part of countries’ capital- 6 -
10 For  a  survey  of  14  industrial  countries  containing  information on regulatory authority in the area of banks’
provision for country risk as of 1994, see Price Waterhouse (1995).
inflows well in advance of an eventual crisis, and in the case of several Asian countries such dependence
was also accompanied by high levels of dependence on interbank lending (BCBS, 1999a, Annex 3 and
p.  3).  It  is  generally  assumed  that  the  two  features  of  short-term  and  interbank  borrowing  were
connected, much of it being driven by interest-rate arbitrage. Thus the attribution of a risk weight to short-
term international interbank lending better consonant with its real risks has become part of the agenda of
reform of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord in order to restrain the destabilizing potential of such lending (as
well  as  to  reduce  the  opportunities  for  regulatory  arbitrage  through  the  manipulation  of its maturity
classification mentioned above).
Among developing countries there is a widespread view that the regulatory regime for banks’
capital should be capable of making a contribution to the stability of capital flows which goes beyond
improved risk weights for international interbank lending. One of the more concrete proposals along these
lines is that supervisors in major countries should vary the capital requirements on banks’ international
lending in response to changes in the risk of different borrowers. In several countries the regulatory
authorities have powers enabling them to influence banks’ provisions for country risk.
10  Now  that
supervisory review is explicitly included in the revised accord (see section IV.B), guidelines in this area
might more appropriately be included under this heading than under numerical capital standards.
III.  THE 1999 CONSULTATIVE PAPER
A.  General approach
Much  of  the  BCBS’s  document  (BCBS,  1999b),  A  New  Capital  Adequacy  Framework
(henceforth New Framework), was drafted with a broad brush, and many of its proposals were clearly
tentative.  Where  the  New  Framework  was  more  concrete  or precise, it did not generally depart
fundamentally from the approach of the 1988 Accord, though its amendments were extensive and many
new options were broached. The objectives of the 1988 Accord were restated but the New Framework
also  accepted  that  while  the  focus  of  a  revised  accord  should  be  internationally active banks, “its
underlying principles should be suitable for application to banks of varying levels of complexity and
sophistication”, thus explicitly acknowledging the BCBS’s expanded role as a global standard setter. The
revised accord was also to “constitute a more comprehensive approach to addressing risks”, in particular
addressing more explicitly operational risk and interest-rate risk in the banking book. - 7 -
The scope of application of a revised accord at the level of industrial structure would be extended
in the New Framework from banks on a consolidated basis (i.e. including subsidiaries undertaking banking
and  other  financial  business)  to  holding  companies  that  are  parents  of  banking  groups.  This  change
reflects what is already the scope of the supervisory practice in some of the BCBS’s member countries.
Moreover the revised accord would be applied on a sub-consolidated basis to all internationally active
banks below the top level of the banking group; and supervisors would ensure that each bank within the
group is adequately capitalized individually. 
The response of the New Framework to concerns mentioned above as to the quality of supervision
and of financial reporting was to include fully fleshed-out sections (Pillars 2 and 3) on supervisory review
and market discipline. In a consultative paper issued in early 2000 (BCBS, 2000), the BCBS elaborated
the recommendations of the New Framework concerning the nature of information to be discussed under
Pillar 3.
The definition of capital in the New Framework remained unchanged from that of the original
Accord (as amended and clarified since 1988). With respect to the amount of capital the New Framework
included among the objectives of a revised accord that it “should at least maintain the current overall level
of capital in the system”. This would imply that new and more explicit capital charges for operational risk
and interest-rate risk in the banking book should on average be expected to offset any reductions due to
changes in requirements for credit risk.
Regarding the treatment of different categories of exposure the New Framework proposed two
approaches, a standardized and an internal ratings-based approach, some aspects of which are discussed
in somewhat more detail below. The first of these, intended for use by less sophisticated banks, was the
filial, amended successor of the approach used in the 1988 Accord. The level of risk-weighted assets for
the purpose of setting regulatory capital requirements was (as before) to be estimated as the product of
risk weights and corresponding exposures. The second approach reflected an acknowledgement of the
innovations by banks in their measurement and control of credit risk since 1988. But this approach fell
short of allowing banks to deploy their own internal models of risk to set their capital changes in a manner
analogous to that allowed for market risks under the 1996 amendment of the 1988 Accord (BCBS, 1996).
In  its  treatment  of different categories of exposure the New Framework also addressed some new
subjects such as new rules for securitization and ways to address new techniques of credit mitigation such
as credit derivatives. - 8 -
B.  Some specific features
Key characteristics of the standardized approach were a slightly extended range of risk weights
for exposures and recourse for the classification of exposures to the ratings of “external credit assessment
institutions” (ECAIs), which could be credit rating agencies fulfilling certain criteria of eligibility or the
export credit agencies of major countries. For sovereign risk this approach would have the result of ending
the reliance under the 1988 Accord on the distinction between OECD and non-OECD exposures. Of the
other two major categories of exposure, banks and corporates, two options were proposed for the former:
under  the  first  private  banks  would  receive  a  rating  one category less favourable than that of the
applicable sovereign or its central bank (subject to ceilings); and under the second recourse would be had
to agencies’ ratings of banks with a floor for risk weights of 20 per cent and a ceiling of 150 per cent.
Under the second option special (and more favourable) provision would be made for interbank loans but
on a basis more restrictive than in the 1988 Accord, since it would apply only to loans with an original
maturity of up to 6 months rather than to those with a residual maturity of up to one year. Other changes
in comparison with the 1988 Accord involved the risk weights for short-term off-balance-sheet items and
for securitized assets. In both cases the New Framework’s target was regulatory arbitrage: for the first
item banks’ practice of rolling over commitments with a term of up to one year to avoid the higher risk
weighting of exposures with longer maturities, and for the second item banks’ use of asset securitization
to reduce their capital requirements, while not necessarily achieving a corresponding reduction in their true
exposure to credit risk.
As already mentioned, the BCBS was unwilling to accept an approach to setting capital charges
for credit risk based on banks’ own internal models. This is the direction in which much of the banking
industry itself would clearly like to move. Such an approach would facilitate alignment of the management
of  regulatory  capital  with  other  dimensions  of  banks’  capital  management, making possible a closer
matching of capital and risk on a comparable basis across transactions, markets and counterparties.
However, not many banks have yet developed comprehensive models for risk capital, and their alignment
with global standards is still at an early stage. In a review of credit risk modelling the BCBS itself has
discussed its shortcomings at some length, in particular those associated with data limitations and model
validation (BCBS, 1999c). Unlike those in the case of the modelling of market risk, predictions for models
of credit risk cannot rely on statistical projections based on long historical time series. Owing to the
resulting dependence on simplifying assumptions and proxy data, an understanding of the sensitivity of
models of credit risk to structural assumptions and parameter estimates is essential to their validation. But
the time frame required for such validation, which should cover a number of credit cycles (and thus a
sufficient number of default events), requires testing on the basis of large amounts of data – so large,- 9 -
indeed, as to be impractical for individual institutions and thus as to necessitate cooperative efforts from
the industry which are currently still only at an early stage.
Thus instead of capital charges estimated with bank’s own internal models the New Framework
came out in favour of an internal ratings-based (IRB) approach involving “risk buckets”. Under this
approach particular categories of exposure would be assigned a risk weight, as in the 1988 Accord, but
in this case through a mapping from exposures to risk weights based wholly or partly on banks’ own
estimates of risk. These procedures would be subject to supervisory review. While the New Framework
endorsed this approach, it did not put forward a detailed blueprint but committed the BCBS to further
examination of the issues with a view to developing a new concrete proposal as part of the next stage of
its work.
On  techniques  of  credit  risk  mitigation  likewise  the New Framework refrained from detailed
proposals, committing the BCBS to consultations on new developments such as credit derivatives as part
of a broader review of all the major different techniques under this heading (including those included in
the 1988 Accord).
C.  Some reactions
The obviously provisional nature of the New Framework and the associated absence of detailed
rules concerning many subjects tended to concentrate public response on particular areas. For example,
commentators noted that the standardized approach entailed only a limited extension of the calibration of
credit risk, which in consequence was still fairly crude. By far the most controversial idea in the New
Framework was the proposed recourse to ECAIs which most commentators took to mean the major
credit rating agencies. One reaction, common among those attempting to predict the impact of the New
Framework on developing countries, was to identify likely beneficiaries and losers among countries as a
result of the attribution of risk weights on the basis of agencies’ ratings of sovereign risk. In this discussion
there was a tendency to forget that the New Framework’s proposal concerned the establishment of
minimum  risk  weights  whose  correspondence  to  the  weights  actually  used  by  banks  in  their  capital
allocation for credit risk might or might not be close. A second criticism of recourse to ECAIs’ ratings
focussed on the pro-cyclicality of the ratings of major agencies. Only if the announcements of the
agencies concerning changes in creditworthiness preceded changes in market conditions such as
borrowing costs, would it seem reasonable to rely on their ex-ante capacity to rate credit risk. But the
results of econometric research and the agencies’ track record during the Asian financial crisis of 1997- 10 -
11 On the agencies’ performance during the Asian crisis see BCBS (1999a: 20–23), and for a review of the
evidence concerning the pro-cyclicality of their ratings see Cornford (2000, sect. VI.A).
12 For two useful summaries of the BCBS’s 2001 consultative document see Jeanneau (2001) and SEC et al. (2001).
provided weak support for this proposition.
11 Indeed, there was widespread concern among developing
countries that if the agencies’ announcements simply parallel changes in market sentiment or, worse still,
follow such changes, recourse to their ratings for setting risk weights for capital standards might actually
exacerbate the instability of bank lending. A third point, also of particular concern to developing countries,
concerned the coverage of major agencies’ ratings. In India, for example, in early 1999 out of 9,640
borrowers enjoying fund-based working capital facilities from banks only 300 had been rated by any of
the major agencies (RBI, 2000: 13–14). This led to calls for more attention to the possibility of recourse
to the ratings of domestic (as opposed to major international) agencies – a proposal not excluded by the
New Framework so long as the agencies in question meet the criteria required.
IV.  THE 2001 DRAFT (MARK 2)
A.  Introduction
12
The  basic  structure  of  the  2001  consultative document,  The  New  Basel  Capital  Accord  and
supporting material (henceforth New Accord), follows that of the June 1999 proposals: an unchanged
definition of items counting as capital; three Pillars; a number of alternative options for numerical
standards under Pillar 1; increased risk sensitivity for the risk weights; explicit recognition of operational
risk and interest-rate risk in the banking book; and new approaches to the treatment of asset securitization
and credit-risk mitigation. But the proposals are now much more concrete and detailed: the most notable
change is the fleshing-out of the IRB approach for numerical standards, two options now being put
forward – “foundation” and “advanced” – partly in order to increase the number of banks’ in a position
to choose the IRB as opposed to the standardized approach. Explicit links between the Pillars have now
been strengthened: a bank’s eligibility for more sophisticated approaches proposed under numerical
standards for capital is dependent on the meeting of certain standards specified under the headings of
supervisory review and transparency; and  interest-rate risk in the banking book is now handled under
supervisory review. Moreover, under the IRB approach and the most advanced approach to estimating
the capital requirement for operational risk, banks are required to integrate their internal risk measurement
into their business operations.- 11 -
However, despite the detail the New Accord still contains many loose ends on which further work
is projected for the final revision. This applies particularly to various parts of the IRB approach such as
the treatment of banks’ equity portfolios, their retail and project-finance exposures, and the best way to
incorporate risks linked to exposures’ maturity.
Since several of the rules concerning the numerical capital standards depend on the fulfilment of
requirements under Pillars 2 and 3, the discussion of major features of the New Accord which follows
reverses the order of the consultative document itself and starts with these two Pillars.
B.  Pillar 2
The key concepts of the New Accord’s treatment of supervisory review are embodied in the
following four principles: (1) banks should have a process for assessing their overall capital in relation to
their risk profile and a strategy for maintaining their capital levels; (2) supervisors should evaluate banks’
policies and actions for these purposes, and should take appropriate supervisory action if they are not
satisfied with the results; (3) supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory
capital ratios and should have the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum; and
(4) supervisors should seek early intervention to prevent capital from falling below the minimum levels
required by a bank’s risk characteristics, and should require remedial action if capital is not maintained
or restored. The detailed discussion of these four principles in the New Accord consists largely of a
check-list of policies and actions required for their fulfilment.
Principles 1 and 2 are linked to the criteria banks must meet if they are to be eligible to use the
more sophisticated methods for setting capital requirements under the IRB approach and with respect to
operational risk. Closely related to these criteria is the requirement implicit in the discussion of Pillar 2 but
taken up explicitly in the relevant parts of the rules for numerical capital standards that banks integrate
their  internal  risk  measurement, undertaken as part of the IRB approach or of the evaluation of
operational risks, into their business decisions concerning such subjects as the pricing of credit risk, the
setting of internal exposure limits, incentive compensation plans, and capital allocation. Principle 4 bears
on the treatment of interest-rate risk in the banking book. Comments during the consultation process
indicated to the BCBS that the nature of the risks faced by banks under this heading and the methods of
monitoring  and  managing  them  were  too  heterogeneous  for  the  establishment  of numerical capital
standards under this heading. Instead the approach chosen is to handle interest-rate risk in the banking
book under Pillar 2 through supervisory review of banks’ internal measurement systems. If supervisors
determine that a bank is not holding capital commensurate with its interest-rate risks, they are to require
it to reduce its risk, to hold additional capital, or to implement some combination of these two actions.- 12 -
13 On the CCL see IMF (1999: 51), and on the role of standards in IMF surveillance ibid. (p. 45).
Unsurprisingly the key principles under Pillar 2 are linked to criteria for assessment of compliance
with the BCBS’s Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision in the areas of capital adequacy
and risk measurement, management and control as set out in the BCBS’s Core Principles Methodology
(especially Principles 6 to 13)  (BCBS, 1999d). These assessments to be carried out not by the BCBS but
by other parties such as the IMF, the World Bank, regional development banks, regional supervisory
organizations and even private consultants or as part of “peer reviews” in which supervisors of one
country assess another and vice versa. The role of the IMF here will be related to its encouragement of
compliance  with  the  Core  Principles in the context of its surveillance mandate which now includes
implementation of financial standards. 
On the face of it the process envisaged here may seem a natural part of global and regional efforts
to promote financial stability but closer examination points to possibly problematic aspects of linking the
New Accord to these assessment exercises. Firstly, limited supervisory capacity is likely to be stretched
by these exercises even while the 1988 Basel Capital Accord still applies. But the New Accord will
represent a quantum increase in the complexity of supervisors’ responsibilities in most countries, and
probably a corresponding increase in the tasks involved in assessment exercises. This suggests that the
ambitious  character  of  the  New  Accord  may  necessitate  some  rethinking  of  the way in which the
assessment exercises are carried out. A second point which needs to be considered here concerns the
way in which assessment exercises that eventually include the New Accord relate to IMF conditionality.
Under the IMF’s Contingency Credit Line (CCL), established in 1999, short-term balance-of-payments
financing is available to countries from the IMF to meet problems due to international financial contagion.
Countries can pre-qualify for the CCL on the basis of conditions which include a positive assessment
during  the  most  recent consultations under IMF Article IV surveillance of progress in adhering to
internationally accepted standards, one set of which relate to banking supervision.
13 It seems legitimate
here to raise the question of the desirability as well as possibly the feasibility of linking an initiative as
technically complex as the New Accord to a feature of international financial governance as politically
contentious as IMF conditionality.
C.  Pillar 3
The  New  Accord  contains  a  wide-ranging  list  of  subjects  to be covered by its disclosure
requirements, including a banks’ capital, accounting policies, risk exposures and risk management. A
distinction is drawn between disclosures classified as “core”, on the one hand, which convey information
vital for the operation of market discipline, and those classified as “supplementary, on the other hand,- 13 -
which are not necessarily of crucial importance for all institutions but should be made by “sophisticated
internationally  active”  banks.  The  New  Accord  also  includes  more  comprehensive disclosure as a
criterion for eligibility for use of the IRB approach for estimating capital requirements, the coverage of
subjects being more extensive in certain areas for the “advanced” than for the “foundation” version.
Moreover  under  both  the  standardized  and  the  IRB  approaches banks are only to benefit from the
provisions of the New Accord regarding the treatment of credit-risk mitigation and asset securitization
if  they meet disclosure requirements about the deployment, monitoring and expected impact of the
techniques and transactions involved.
In its background remarks the BCBS refers to various problems related to transparency and its
effectiveness. One of these concerns proprietary information which, if disclosed, might reduce the value
of banks’ investments in certain areas or undermine its competitive position. Amongst the subjects which
spring to mind here are interest-rate risk in the banking book and the management of operational risk.
Under the first heading the disclosure of certain information about a bank’s position and strategy
regarding interest-rate risk could be advantageous to other market participants in their transactions with
it. Thus the disclosure requirements for interest-rate risk in the banking book are of a fairly general
character and focus heavily on management and measurement systems as well as on the methods used
for  scenario  analysis  and  stress  testing.  Operational  risk  may prove to be a source of still greater
difficulties, partly owing to the fact that measurement and control are still at a much earlier stage of
development than for interest-rate risk in the banking book (a matter discussed further below in section
IV.L). These considerations explain the still tentative approach of the BCBS to certain aspects of this
subject: for example, its proposal that “ultimately” disclosure requirements will be a precondition for using
sophisticated  approaches  to  setting capital requirements for operational risk ( Pillar  3  [Market
Discipline]:  17)  and  its  acknowledgment  that  a  requirement to publish loss data might serve as a
disincentive to the development of more sophisticated approaches to operational risk (Pillar 3 [Market
Discipline]: 52).
The  BCBS  stresses the dependence of disclosures’ usefulness on their frequency. Its basic
guideline is that disclosures should be made on a semi-annual basis but that owing to the rapidity of
changes in certain categories of exposure such as market risk more frequent disclosure may be necessary
in some cases – quarterly disclosures, for example, for internationally active banks. But even quarterly
reporting  does  not  solve  difficulties regarding the effectiveness of transparency to which William
McDonough,  Chairman  of  the BCBS, drew attention years ago in the following frequently quoted
remarks: “formerly you could look at the balance sheet of a financial institution and quickly get a sense
of exposure and risks. Today balance-sheet information is clearly inadequate for this purpose. … the fast
pace of activity in today’s market renders financial statements stale almost before they can be prepared”
(Leach et al., 1993: 15–16).- 14 -
14 This view is that of the BCBS itself (BCBS, 1999b: 8–9). But disentangling the impact on banks’ capital levels
of  market  discipline,  regulatory pressure and other factors bearing on the management of their balance sheets is
analytically difficult (BCBS, 1999e: 6–10).
The burden of the disclosure requirements of Pillar 3 will often be considerable. The disclosures
are to apply to banking groups on a consolidated basis, significant amounts of information also being
required concerning entities within the group on a sub-consolidated basis as well as concerning other
entities related to the groups but not included in the consolidation. The changes in their reporting systems
entailed by these requirements may be only incremental for most internationally active banks. Greater
changes will be necessary for groups undertaking mergers and acquisitions but mostly ones that would
be  a  part  of  the  integration  of  reporting  systems  which  would  take  place  in  any  event.  For  less
sophisticated banks – and the majority of banks in developing countries may fall into this category – the
situation may often be more difficult. The BCBS’s awareness of this problem is reflected in its distinction
between “core” and “supplementary” disclosures under which only the first would be obligatory for less
sophisticated banks. Even so implementation can often be expected to be slow and difficult, since, inter
alia, it may depend on upgrading of accounting and auditing standards, itself a far from negligible task.
It should also be remembered that in several developing and transition economies the new disclosure
requirements will have to apply to state-owned banks or banks controlled by small groups which have
previously been subject to at best tax rules concerning transparency.
There would appear to be widespread agreement that new standards of transparency regarding
bank capital were one of the beneficial consequences of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord, and that the 8-
per-cent ratio is now generally taken to be a minimum by investors in major financial markets.
14 The hope
is that the New Accord will build on this. But the types of transparency required by the New Accord are
only a part (though a major part) of transparency more generally concerning banks’ operations, and there
is a continuing need for a sense of proportion as to what this can achieve. The BCBS itself notes that
during its consultative process “respondents … pointed out that the release of too much information could
blur the key signals to the market” (Overview of The New Basel Capital Accord: 35), and the recent
financial history of developed countries provides many examples of transparency’s limits in preventing
financial instability. 
D.  The standardized approach to credit risk: (1) the main risk weightings
The rules for the risk weights of major categories of exposure under the standardized approach
follow the general lines of those in the 1999 New Framework, but the New Accord also fleshes out here
in detail the treatment of credit risk mitigation and asset securitization (subjects taken up in the following
section). The main changes in the rules for risk weights since the 1999 paper involve a tightening of the- 15 -
15 The codes and standards in question are the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standards (SDDS), the BCBS’s
Core  Principles  for  Effective  Banking  Supervision,  and  IOSCO’s  30  Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation.
16 Other  institutions such as various public-sector entities and multilateral development banks receive risk
weights determined by the degree of resemblance of their risk profiles to those of institutions belonging to the three
major  categories,  their credit ratings, their relations with their shareholders, their capital and liquidity, and their
lending and financial policies.
17 For  the  OECD’s  methodology  (intended to foster convergence amongst member countries in the setting of
premia for export credit insurance) see OECD (1997).
definition of short-term interbank loans subject to more favourable treatment, greater differentiation in the
calibration  of  risks  for  corporates,  further  definition  of  the  contents  of  the  high  (150-per-cent)  risk
category, abandonment of the requirement of adherence to key codes and standards
15 as a precondition
of eligibility for certain preferential risk weights, abandonment also of the floor for the risk weights of
highly rated banks and corporates determined by the sovereign rating of their territory of incorporation,
more detail on the way in which the credit assessments of export credit agencies would be used, and
procedures for handling cases where there are divergences in the risk weights based on the credit
assessment of different ECAIs.
The revised risk weights of the New Accord for the three major categories of exposure
16 are
shown in table 1. The mapping from ECAIs’ credit assessments to risk weights for sovereigns follows
that of the 1999 New Framework. Export credit agencies adhering to the OECD’s methodology for
setting benchmarks for minimum export insurance premiums for country risk and publishing their risk
scores are now recognized as eligible ECAIs for the purpose of setting risk weights for sovereigns but
not for the other categories of exposure.
17 For corporates the mapping from credit assessments to risk
weights has changed somewhat from that in the New Framework: a weight of 50 per cent has been
added for entities with credit assessments in the range A+ to A-; corporates can now receive a risk
weight higher than that of their territory of incorporation where this is indicated by their respective credit
assessments;  and  the  greater  detail  concerning  the  higher  (150-per-cent)  risk  categories  includes  the
attribution of a risk weight of 150 per cent to the unsecured part of any asset that is past due for more
than 90 days (net of a bank’s specific provisions for loan losses). The 100-per-cent weight for unrated
corporates is retained despite the resulting incentive for certain borrowers to avoid or give up their ratings.
Here the BCBS’s overriding concern is to avoid “an unwarranted increase in the cost of funding for small
and medium-sized businesses, which in most countries are a primary source of job creation and economic
growth” (The Standardised Approach to Credit Risk: 8).- 16 -
Table 1
Risk weights of BCBS’s New Basel Capital Accord




                                                                                                              
Claim AAA to A+ to BBB+ to BB+ to Below
AA- A- BBB- B- B- Unrated
Sovereign 0 20 50 100 150 100
Banks: option 1
b 20 50 100 100 150 100
option 2
c 20 50 50 100 150 50
(Short-term claims)
d  (20) (20) (20) (50) (150) (20)
Credit assessment
                                                                                                                      
Corporates AAA to A+ to BBB+ to Below
AA- A- BBB- BB- Unrated
20 50 100 150 100
Source: BCBS (2001, Part 2, section II.A).
a The  notations  are  those  of  Standard  &  Poors  used  as  an  example  only and could have been replaced
by those of other credit rating agencies.
b Based on weighting of sovereign in which bank is incorporated.
c Based on credit assessment of the individual bank.
d Applicable under option 2 to claims having an original maturity of three months or less of banks with
a risk weight below 150 per cent..
Under the first option for banks, as in the 1999 New Framework, entities in a given country are
assigned a weight one category less favourable than their sovereign of incorporation subject to specified
ceilings. Under the second option the risk weight is based on the bank’s own rating subject to a floor of
20 per cent but with the difference in comparison with the New Framework that the risk weight of a bank
can be lower than that of its sovereign of incorporation when this is justified by their respective credit
assessments.  The  original  maturity of short-term interbank claims eligible (under option 2) for the
preferential risk weight shown in table 1 has been reduced from six months or less to three months or less
on the grounds that “in practice the upper maturity bound in the short-term inter-bank market is generally
three months” (ibid.: 7). There will also be discretion for countries under both options for banks to assign
to claims with an original maturity of three months or less and funded in domestic currency a risk weight
which is one category less favourable than that of the sovereign of incorporation, subject to the condition- 17 -
18 The  risk  assessments  of  export  credit  agencies  are  widely  viewed  as  manifesting  the  same  tendency  as  credit-
rating agencies to follow rather than anticipate cycles in financing, though subject frequently to a greater degree
of inertia. This point is emphasized in Griffith-Jones and Spratt (2001: 6–7).
that a lower risk weight than in table 1 is applied to bank’s exposures to the sovereign of incorporation
itself which are denominated and funded in domestic currency.
The mapping of ECAIs’ credit assessments into the risk weights is to be the responsibility of bank
supervisors.  Rules  are  specified for the procedures to be followed when there are two or more
assessments  by  different  ECAIs  corresponding to different risk weights: where there are two such
assessments, the higher risk weight applies; and where there are more than two, the two assessments
corresponding to the lowest risk weights are the relevant ones and, in the event of their differing, the
higher weight should be used.
Thus,  despite  the  reservations  expressed  concerning  the  use  of  agencies’ ratings under the
standardized approach (see section III.C above), the BCBS has stuck to its guns in the absence of an
easily identifiable alternative.
18 But it has designed its IRB approach, in particular its “foundation” and
“advanced” versions, in a way which would appear to be intended for use by a larger number of banks
than that envisaged in the 1999 New Framework. If successful, this should reduce the number of banks
undertaking substantial international lending (including to developing countries) whose credit assessment
and risk weights are linked to those of credit rating agencies as set out in the standardized approach. More
generally  the BCBS believes that the benefits of more risk-sensitive capital requirements for banks
outweigh costs due to their potential for amplifying lending cycles (Overview of The New Basel Capital
Accord: 40). Concretely these benefits would presumably be reflected in a long-term tendency towards
lower risk premia in interest rates owing to a reduced incidence of periods of financial instability, which
would outweigh short-term increases in premia during such periods. Long historical experience suggests
that this may not be much more than a pious hope. Nonetheless, there may be ways (sketched but not
elaborated in section V) of supplementing or modifying the BCBS’s new proposals which could reduce
the contribution they may make to pro-cyclicality in lending.
E.  The standardized approach to credit risk: (2) credit risk mitigation
The 1999 New Framework promised an approach to the treatment of credit risk mitigation based
on a review of the major techniques and instruments used for this purpose, namely collateral, netting,
guarantees  and  credit  derivatives.  The  section  of  the  New  Accord  on  netting  generalizes the 1998
proposal for amendment of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord concerning the subject, allocating risk weights
to exposures due to sums covered by netting agreements for loans and deposits on a basis similar to that
for  collateralized  exposures  (BCBS, 1998). In the 1988 Capital Accord recognition of collateral and
guarantees took the form of substituting the risk weight of the issuer or guarantor for that of the original- 18 -
19 The operation of these rules can be illustrated algebraically for the case where the value of the uncollateralized
exposure (E) exceeds that of the value of the collateral (CA) adjusted for “haircuts”. Here r* x E (the risk-weighted
exposure) = r [E - (1 - w) CA], where r* is the risk weight after allowance for risk reduction due to collateralization,
r is the risk weight of the uncollateralized exposure, and w is the floor factor explained in the text.
obligor.  The  New  Accord  now  also  admits recognition of collateral in a different way, namely the
reduction of exposure by a measure of the value of eligible collateral. The approach in the New Accord
to guarantees and credit derivatives builds on the substitution approach of the 1988 Accord, the risk
weight  for  exposures  becoming a weighted average of those of the guarantor or supplier of credit
protection and of the underlying obligor.
For collateral the New Accord proposes two alternative approaches, a “comprehensive” and a
“simple” one. Under both approaches the categories of eligible financial instruments (cash, gold, specified
debt instruments, equities, and units issued by UCITS or mutual funds) are broadened in comparison with
the  1988  Accord.  Moreover  minimum  standards  and  conditions  for  these  instruments must be met
regarding such matters as legal certainty and associated risk management and revaluation procedures.
Under the “comprehensive” approach the underlying risk exposure is reduced by a conservative
estimate of the value of the collateral. The risks due to price volatility of the collateral and the time needed
for its liquidation are handled through “haircuts” or reductions in the collateral’s value which may be
calculated either in accordance with standard supervisory rules or by banks themselves satisfying certain
minimum  standards.  For many categories of collateral there are also residual risks due to possible
continuing exposure to the obligor owing to legal difficulties concerning title or to other reasons causing
the effective worthlessness of the collateral. Account is taken of these residual risks through a floor
capital requirement (denoted w) reflecting an irreductible dependence on the underlying obligor’s credit
quality.
19 w is set at zero for exposures associated with low-risk transactions involving the borrowing and
lending of government securities meeting certain conditions.
Under the “simple” approach the substitution of the risk weight of the collateral issuer is substituted
for that of the obligor as in the 1988 Accord. To be eligible for this approach, the collateral must be
pledged for the life of the exposure (so that there is no maturity mismatch) and must be revalued through
marking to market at least every six months (but there is no obligation for “haircuts”). Except in cases
where certain risk-reducing conditions are met, the risk weight for the collaterized part of an exposure
is subject to a floor of 20 per cent. The BCBS expects recourse to the “simple” approach to lead to higher
capital requirements, that will thus act as an incentive to the adoption of the “comprehensive” approach
except for banks which engage to only a limited extent in collateralized transactions of the kind being
targeted and for which applying “haircuts” on a transaction-by-transaction basis would be unduly costly.
The treatment of guarantees and credit derivatives is a modified version of that of the former in the
1988 Accord, where the risk of the guarantor was substituted for that of the obligor. In contrast to the- 19 -
20 Under a total return swap the seller of risk/buyer of protection pays to the buyer of risk/seller of protection
the  cashflows  generated  by  a  reference  asset  (including  both  coupon  payments  and  appreciations  in capital value)
in return for its cost of funding plus an amount for losses on the asset in the event of a “credit event” that triggers
them. Under a credit default swap the buyer of risk receives a premium in return for the obligation to pay an amount
linked to losses due to a “credit event”. In the case of another generic credit derivative, the credit-linked note, which
is not recognized for treatment as a credit derivative in the New Accord, the buyer of risk pays the face value of the
note in return for an agreed rate of return until the occurrence of a “credit event”, at which time the note is redeemed
by the issuer (seller of risk) at a price less than that at its original issue. In the New Accord, when a bank issues such
notes  to  hedge  exposures  in  its  banking  book,  the  hedge  is  treated  as  collateralization of the exposure by cash and
is subject to the capital requirements specified for this technique.
21 This can be illustrated algebraically for the case in which the unprotected exposure (E) is greater than the value
of the guarantee or credit protection (GA) so that E x r* = (E - GA) x r + GA [w x r + (1 - w) x g], where r* is the
effective  risk  weight for the exposure after allowance for protection,  r  is  the  risk  weight  of  the  obligor,  g  the  risk
weight of the protection provider, and w the factor to cover the residual risk of the obligor. w = 0.15 for all credit
derivatives  recognized  as  providing  protection  and  for  all  guarantees  except  those  provided by sovereigns, central
banks  and  banks  for  which  w  =  0.  The  logic  of  the  exception  made  only  for  certain  guarantees  is  not  self-evident:
if guarantees provided by banks qualify for a zero w, it may be asked why this rule should not also apply to credit
derivatives from the same source.
treatment of the latter in the 1988 Accord allowance is made in the New Accord for residual risks linked
to the underlying obligor even for that part of an exposure covered by the protection due to the guarantee
or the credit derivative (for reasons similar to those given above in the case of collateral). Once again
there are minimum requirements to be met for recognition of the degree of credit mitigation due to the
guarantees  or  credit  derivatives:  these  concern  such matters as relevant features of banks’ risk
management, disclosure, operational requirements for the contracts involved, and the identity of eligible
guarantors and protection providers. Moreover in the case of credit derivatives only transactions classified
as credit default swaps and total return swaps are to be eligible for recognition.
20 The risk weight after
allowance for the risk reduction due to the guarantee or credit derivative is then a weighted average of
the risk weights of the guarantor or supplier of protection and of the underlying obligor, where the weight
of the latter is intended to cover the residual risks mentioned above.
21 
The New Accord sets rules covering some but not all of the issues mentioned in section A
concerning which the regulation of credit derivatives is still in flux and subject to variation among major
national  financial markets. For example, when there are mismatches between the exposure and the
reference asset whose performance triggers payments under the credit derivative, restrictive conditions
regarding  the  relation  between  this  asset  and  that issued by the underlying obligor must be met if
protection afforded by the credit derivative is to be recognized in setting capital requirements. The BCBS
accepts that in the case of a protected exposure the bank suffers a loss only if both the obligor and the
supplier of credit protection default. However, in the absence of a satisfactory proxy for the “double
default effect”, there is no broader recognition of the effects of the lack of correlation between these two
risks of default in the New Accord (which will have implications for the costs of different hedges of credit
risk). Currency mismatches between the hedging instrument and the exposure are admitted: these are not- 20 -
a source of outright foreign-exchange risk but of contingent risk since a bank suffers loss only if the
borrower fails to pay and the exchange rate moves adversely for the buyer of protection under the hedge.
The existence of risk due to currency mismatches is handled in the same way as in the case of collateral,
namely through “haircuts” or reductions in the value of credit protection provided. While the requirements
of the New Accord regarding credit derivatives constitute a step in the direction of greater regulatory
uniformity, they would appear still to leave significant latitude for variation at the national level (and thus
also for regulatory arbitrage by banks). Further progress in this area will depend on the improved
understanding that will result form more extended experience of these instruments. 
F.  The standardized approach to credit risk: (3) asset securitization
In the New Framework the BCBS proposed that capital charges for asset securitizations should
be based on the ratings of ECAIs. This was designed to address investments in paper issued by special
purpose vehicles (SPVs) secured on pools of assets in the global market for such paper in which many
internationally active banks participate. The proposal on the subject in the New Accord is considerably
more detailed and designed to cover the different categories of risk that remain with banks in their roles
as originators and providers of credit enhancements as well as investors in the market for securitized
assets.
For banks’ investments in securitized assets the BCBS retains the reliance of the New Framework
on the ratings of ECAIs for the attribution of risk weights, the relation between such weights and ratings
above  BBB-  being  the  same  as  for  interbank  exposures  under  the  first  option  of  the  standardized
approach and more stringent treatment being reserved for assets rated BB+ and lower. Much of the rest
of the New Framework’s treatment of investments in securitized assets concerns the conditions for the
applicability of the so-called “look-through approach” to unrated securitization structures, under which
they may be classified as indirect holdings of the underlying asset pools. These conditions are designed
to ensure that investors are exposed to these pools and not to the issuer. 
Regarding banks’ role as originators of securitized assets and as providers of credit enhancements
the New Accord sets out the conditions to be met for securitized assets to be removed from a bank’s
balance sheet and the capital requirements for the risks remaining with the bank after securitization. The
condition for the assets’ removal from the balance sheet is that there should be a “clean break” between
the bank originating the securitization, on the one hand, and the assets after the securitization has taken
place, on the other, through their transfer by means of a true sale or subparticipation. The specific
requirements are also intended to minimize the subsequent reputational risks to a bank. The remaining
rules cover the capital requirements for circumstances where there is no such “clean break” as well as
disclosure requirements concerning the scale and nature of a bank’s role in asset securitization which- 21 -
must  be  met  in  order  for  it  to gain more favourable capital treatment for asset securitizations. The
circumstances where there is no “clean break” include obligations to provide short-term liquidity in the
market  for  the  securitized  assets  and  revolving  securitizations  with  early  amortisation  features,  i.e.
securitizations involving loans drawn under commitments to lend, which include, for example, credit-card
securitizations as well as commercial loans drawn down under long-term commitments. Early amortisation
features here require the originating bank to provide funding at a time when the credit quality of the asset
pool  is  deteriorating  and  in  some  cases  may  lead  to  situations  where  the  originator’s  interest  in  the
securitized assets is effectively subordinated to that of other investors by the formula for the allocation
of payments. 
Not only originating but also sponsoring banks may provide credit enhancements or liquidity facilities
to asset securitizations. Moreover banks may provide various forms of implicit recourse to an asset
securitization even where the transaction meets criteria for a “clean break”. The New Accord specifies
rules and capital requirements for such situations, while also noting that they involve a number of grey
areas concerning which further work is to be carried out as part of the final stage of the consultation
process.
G.  The IRB approach to credit risk: (1) “foundation”, “advanced” and risk components
The  basic elements of the IRB approach are a classification of exposure by a set of broad
categories, for each of these exposure categories the estimation of risk components which in combination
determine the risk-weights and the risk-weighted assets for the purpose of estimating capital requirements,
and minimum conditions (varying somewhat for the different categories of exposure) to be met if a bank
is to be eligible for the different versions of the IRB approach.
The six broad categories of risk exposure under the IRB approach are corporates, sovereigns,
banks, retail, project finance, and equity. These differ from the categories of the standardized approach
(sovereigns, corporates and banks) but are intended to be more consistent with industry practice and thus
more appropriate for the IRB approach.
For exposures to corporates, sovereigns and banks the estimation of risk-weighted assets follows
similar lines in each case. The basic inputs into this estimation are probability of default (PD), loss given
default (LGD), in some cases maturity (M), and exposure at default (EAD). The first three determine the
risk-weight (RW) applying to an exposure. The product of RW and EAD then gives the risk-weighted
assets determining capital requirements. Reliance on internal ratings for these inputs differs between the
“foundation”  and  “advanced”  versions  of  the  IRB  approach. Under the “foundation” version a bank
estimates internally the PDs associated with different exposures but relies on supervisory rules for its
estimates of the other inputs. Under the “advanced” version banks use their internal estimates of LGD- 22 -
22 The procedures for the treatment of M appear more clear-cut in The New Basel Capital Accord (p. 44) itself
than in the supporting document, The Internal Ratings - Based Approach (pp. 25–27), where there is more emphasis
on their provisional character.
23 The  cumulative  risk  of  default  measures  the  total  default  probability  for  a  counterparty  during  a  specified
period  (typically  the  term  of  an  obligation),  while  the  marginal  risk  of  default  measures  the  change  in  default
probability during a shorter period (typically a year).
24 The  nature  of  the  BCBS’s  review  of  banks’  management  of  interbank exposures is not clear from the
description  here.  But  for  obvious  reasons  this  is  a  subject  concerning  which  the  BCBS has vast accumulated
experience.
and EAD (as well as of the effects on their exposure of guarantees and credit derivatives). The proposed
treatment  of  M  in  the  New  Accord  is  still  somewhat  provisional:  the  BCBS is leaning towards a
requirement under the “advanced” version that assessments of M be provided by banks themselves, while
under the “foundation” version it is considering the two alternative options of a uniform assessment of
maturity of three years or of  explicit maturity adjustments set by supervisors.
22 For reasons explained
below the disaggregation of the determinants of the level of risk-weighted assets used for corporates,
banks  and  sovereigns  is  not  considered  appropriate  or  feasible  for  retail,  project-finance and equity
exposures. When a bank meets the conditions for any one of the elements belonging to the “advanced”
version of the IRB approach, it may adopt this version for the element in question. However, once it has
made this move, supervisors would expect it to take the steps required for it to be able to adopt all the
elements of the “advanced” version within a reasonably short period of time.
In view of the role of PD, LGD, EAD and M in determining levels of risk-weighted assets the
problems involved in generating dependable estimates for each are worth examining in more detail. Such
an examination also throws light on some of the difficulties which confront the design of models of credit
risk (and which explain the BCBS’s unwillingness to accept banks’ own models for setting their capital
charges).
Regarding PD banks themselves have large amounts of data on the frequency of defaults (often
covering substantial historical periods) which make possible estimates of default probability for different
categories of borrowers. Default rates (cumulative and marginal)
23 are also a subject on which large
amounts  of  data  are  available  from  credit  rating  agencies.  The  BCBS  collected from major banking
organisations and trade associations information on their internal capital allocation for large corporate
loans. The data were then used to estimate implied risk weights (relative economic capital requirements)
attributed by banks to corporate loans with given PD, LGD and M configurations. The exercise indicated
broad comparability across banks in the relation between PDs and relative economic capital (for fixed
LGD and M)  (Internal Ratings-Based Approach: 35). A similarly acceptable level of comparability in
the measurement of PD for interbank exposures was indicated by the BCBS’ review of internal
management in this area (ibid.: 73).
24 Banks’ estimates of PD for sovereigns rely heavily on the credit- 23 -
25 See, for example, the review of Moody’s default studies in Fons (1998).
assessments of rating agencies, data on credit spreads, and (less frequently) on statistical models, and are
also  characterized  by  a  reasonable  degree  of  comparability (ibid.: 75). These findings underline the
BCBS’s decision to accept banks’ own estimates of PD for these three categories of exposure in the
“foundation” version.
Estimating LGD is less straightforward. LGD depends on the recovery rate, the time taken for and
other  costs  associated  with  recovery,  the  value  of  collateral  or of the protection afforded by other
techniques of credit mitigation, and the exposure’s seniority. The distinction between LGD and EAD is
not completely clear-cut. For example, netting, the technique of credit-risk mitigation discussed above in
section IV.E, is usually allowed for by means of the resulting reduction under EAD, but an alternative
approach via its impact on LGD could equally be envisaged in principle. Some of the difficulties in
estimating LGD are due to legal uncertainties limited to default and restructuring, and others to problems
of modelling the effects on LGD of collateralization and other techniques of credit-risk mitigation. Despite
these difficulties, in the case of exposures to corporates the BCBS’s survey of data from major banking
organisations, and trade associations indicated that banks’ implied risk weights (relative economic capital
requirements) “were reasonably proportional” to their assumptions concerning LGD (ibid.: 35). However,
its finding for LGD in the case of sovereigns, is that banks’ assessments are not yet well developed, partly
owing to the scarcity of data on loan recovery (ibid.: 75). Its conclusion concerning LGD for exposures
to corporates, banks and sovereigns is that existing measurement practices only justify recourse to banks’
own estimates subject to the more stringent requirements of the “advanced” version of the IRB approach.
The data on default rates of rating agencies indicate the dependence of marginal default rates on
the maturity of obligations. The typical pattern for publicly issued bonds is that marginal default rates
increase with the length of the period considered for entities with high ratings but decrease for those with
more speculative ones. A frequent explanation of this pattern is that small and growing firms as well as
maturer firms shifting their capital structures in the direction of a greater share for debt face considerable
near-term uncertainty regarding their ability to meet their obligations but that, once past these obstacles,
often experience an improvement in their outlook. Firms with better ratings, on the other hand, face very
low default risk in the near term but further into the future their credit outlook is more uncertain.
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Nonetheless the process determining the change in marginal default risk through time is not yet considered
well understood, and there is a question as to how far the experience of default risk for bonds (the
principal subject of rating agencies’ analyses) is an appropriate indication for that of loans in the banking
book which are intended to be held until maturity. In its review of banks’ practices the BCBS found a lack
of consensus as to the appropriate adjustment of M for maturity between a mark-to-market (MTM)
approach, on the one hand, and a default-mode (DM) approach, on the other: under the former a loan’s- 24 -
26 Matten  (2000:  197–199)  illustrated  the  skewed,  non-linear time pattern of a bank’s exposure under a single
receive-fixed/pay-floating interest-rate swap with an initial maturity of 10 years.
27 The  BCBS’s  definition  of  retail  exposures  is  based  on  criteria  intended  “to  capture  homogeneous  portfolios
comprising  a large number of small, low value loans with either a consumer or business focus and where the
incremental risk of any single exposure is small” (The Internal Ratings-Based Approach: 55–56).
28 It should be noted that under the New Accord an operational distinction is not drawn between expected losses
(i.e. the average level expected from a set of exposures during a given period) and unexpected losses, estimated as
a measure of the volatility of expected losses. This is in contrast to the literature of the subject and to widespread
practice under which expected losses are treated as a cost of doing business and often covered by reserves set aside
for the purpose, while unexpected losses are covered by risk capital. The reason for the BCBS’s decision is the lack
of  uniformity  among  different  countries’  regimes  in the definition of provisions for losses or loan loss reserves as
well  the  inclusion  of  general  provisions  for  losses  in  capital  under  the  1988 Basel Capital Accord. Risk weights in
the New Accord are thus calibrated to include expected as well as unexpected losses, but the definitive treatment
of  this  issue  is  a  subject  on  which  the  BCBS  is  inviting  further  comment  during  the  final  stage  of  the  consultation
process (ibid.: 40–41).
risk rating is linked to an assumed market-based credit spread, an approach which can accommodate data
on the marginal default risk of publicly issued bonds, while under the latter the assumption that loan is held
until maturity (or default) is thought to require a basis for estimating the risk of loss different from its
market-based credit spread (The Internal Ratings-Based Approach: 36–40).
The EAD for a drawn loan with a fixed repayment schedule is simple to estimate, and a similar
approach focussing on nominal values can be used for other on-balance sheet exposures. Off-balance
sheet exposures such as those due to undrawn credit commitments, guarantees, and OTC derivative
transactions are more complex. For OTC derivatives the credit risk is limited to the cost of replacing the
cash flow (on contracts with a positive value) if the counterparty defaults. Although this amount is often
only a small percentage of the nominal amount of the transaction, total net exposure on this count for a
bank can be large and hard to estimate owing to its dependence on assumptions about future interest rates
and asset prices.
26 Here too the BCBS has concluded that recourse to banks’ own estimates of EAD
should be conditional on the more stringent requirements of the “advanced” version of the IRB approach.
While for corporate exposures banks’ systems typically assign specific ratings to borrowers and
loans which can be linked to a schedule of default probabilities, for retail loans
27 banks rely on division of
their portfolios into segments consisting of exposures with similar risk characteristics. PD and LGD or
expected  loss  (EL)  (determined  by  PD  and  LGD)
28  are  then  assessed  and  quantified  at  the level of
segments rather than of individual exposures, an important role here often being played by scoring
practices used for managing approval, monitoring, control and collection. The BCBS’s survey of industry
practice regarding banks’ retail exposures showed substantial diversity in the way in which key concepts
are given operational form. Nevertheless such are the availability and usefulness of data on risk and
borrowers’ performance for this category of exposure that subject to specified conditions the BCBS
decided to admit use of banks’ own estimates of the key inputs to the estimation of risk-weighted assets,
a decision which would entail no distinction between “foundation” and “advanced” versions of the IRB- 25 -
approach. These inputs are EAD and either PD and LGD or EL. The option of single EL estimates is
accepted on the grounds that, where banks use this combined figure for risk rating, the incremental
benefits  often  do  not  justify  disaggregation  into  the  separate  determinants,  PD  and  LGD. M. is not
explicitly recognized as a separate input for retail exposures.
Project finance covers lending where the performance of the project “is intended to warrant the
debt service and, accordingly, serves as the primary source of repayment”(ibid.: 85). It is a major source
of financing for sectors such as natural resources, mining, power, transport infrastructure, construction,
telecommunications, and commercial real estate. Several features of project financing differentiate the
determination of PD, LGD, EL and EAD from that for corporate exposures, including the degree of
uniqueness of transactions (which implies the lack of a track record for assessing risk), the structuring
of the project in such a way that its cash flows can meet the obligations of debt service, banks’ willingness
to accept debt restructuring in the event of difficulties in meeting these obligations, and the intensity of the
interactions between PD, LGD and EAD. M is once again a relevant risk input for project financing. As
a result of these considerations the approach of the New Accord to the subject is still tentative and
provisional,  and  a  decision has not been taken as to whether a distinction will be needed between
“foundation” and “advanced” versions of the IRB approach.
The discussion in the New Accord of possible ways to treat equity holdings in the banking book is
still more tentative. Unsurprisingly in view of the inapplicability of the legal concept of default to equity
holdings, approaches based on the risk inputs, PD, LGD and EL are not common features of industry
practice. The BCBS notes that a number of international banks estimate exposure under this heading
through approaches based on market risk and stress testing. But its description of these approaches is
sketchy, and (as mentioned above) equity holdings in the banking bank are a subject concerning which
the BCBS is seeking further feedback during the final stage of the consultation process.
H.  The IRB approach: (2) risk-weighted assets
As already described, risk-weighted assets are estimated under the IRB approach as the product
of RW and EAD, where RW is a function of PD, LGD and M, the objective being a figure more finely
tuned  to  the  risks  of  different  exposures  than  under  the  standardized  approach.  For  exposures  to
corporates, sovereigns and banks the basic formula for RW is the smaller of (LGD/50) x BRWc (PD) or
12.5 x LGD, multiplied by [1 + b(PD) x (M-3) ] (where the subscript c denotes corporates exposures
and b(PD) is a maturity adjustment factor depending on PD). BRWc is a continuous function of PD
selected on the basis of pooled survey and model-based evidence to represent the relation between PD
and RW for a benchmark loan with a three-year maturity and LGD of 50 per cent. It is itself the product
of  three  factors:  the  first  represents  the  sum  of  expected  and  unexpected losses associated with a- 26 -
hypothetical portfolio of one-year loans with LGD of 100 per cent, the second an adjustment to reflect
the calibration of the IRB benchmark RW to a three-year average M, and the third a scaling factor set
so that the IRB benchmark RW is 100 per cent for values of PD and LGD of 0.7 per cent and 50 per
cent. (LGD/50) is a factor designed to adjust BRWc for the difference between actual LGD and the 50
per cent level for the benchmark loan, and [1 + b(PD) x (M-3) ] a factor to adjust for maturities other
than three years.  b(PD) is non-negative, so that RW increases for longer maturities.
To be eligible for the IRB approach a bank must meet requirements regarding its differentiation of
credit risk and the completeness and integrity of its ratings, the oversight of its rating system, its rating
criteria, its estimation of PD, its data collection and information systems, the incorporation of its internal
ratings into its management and financial decisions, its system for validating the consistency and accuracy
of its ratings, and disclosure. Additional minimum requirements must be met for banks’ eligibility for the
“advanced” as opposed to the “foundation” version of the IRB approach.
Some of the eligibility requirements merit more detailed discussion here owing to the light thus
thrown on the meaning of the terms in the algebraic expressions above. Under both versions of the IRB
approach rating systems should have two dimensions, one to cover the risk of default and the other
transaction-specific factors such as collateral and other associated conditions. There should be a minimum
of between six and nine grades for performing loans, and a minimum of two grades for non-performing
ones,  and  avoidance  of  excessive  concentration  of  loans  in  any  one  grade.  A  key  input  of  the  IRB
approach is a one-year estimate of PD for different categories of exposure. Such an estimate should be
based on a conservative view of the long-run average (using an observation period of at least five years),
and can be generated by three techniques, (i) internal default experience, (ii) mapping to external data,
and (iii) statistical default models. Moreover the estimate should be based on a reference definition of the
events constituting default (The New Basel Capital Accord: 52).
Under  the  “foundation”  version  of  the  IRB  approach  banks  are  to  estimate  LGD  and  EAD  in
accordance with standard supervisory rules. In the case of LGD senior claims without specifically
recognized collateral are assigned a figure of 50 per cent, and subordinated claims without such collateral
a  figure  of  75  per  cent.  The  rules  for  the  recognition  of  collateral are similar to those of the
“comprehensive” approach to this subject under the standardized approach to credit risk described above
in section IV.E. However, the supervisory rules under the “foundation” version of the IRB approach also
admit as eligible capital commercial and residential real estate that meets minimum conditions regarding
the value of the collateral in relation to that of the exposure. Owing to the wide variety of practice,
recovery and loss experience among countries, the standard supervisory rules do not admit other real
collateral such as inventory, accounts receivable, and plant and equipment. The EAD of on-balance sheet
exposures is valued under the supervisory rules of the “foundation” version at their nominal amounts
(subject to allowance for netting of loans and deposits). The EAD of off-balance sheet exposures- 27 -
involving transactions with an uncertain future drawdown is to be 75 per cent of the off-balance sheet
amount for commitments and similar revolving credits, and is estimated with a set of credit conversion
factors for various other items (direct credit substitutes, transaction-related contingent items such as
performance  bonds, short-term self-liquidating trade-related contingent items, sale and repurchase
agreements and asset sales with recourse, various forward commitments, and note issuance and revolving
underwriting facilities). The EAD of OTC derivatives is estimated as in the 1988 Basel Capital Accord
on the basis of the replacement cost plus specified “add-ons” varying by transaction type and residual
maturity to reflect potential future exposure. As mentioned in section IV.G, for M under the “foundation”
version of the IRB approach the BCBS puts forward two possible options: treatment of all exposures as
having the same (conservatively assessed) maturity of three years – which is equivalent to a maturity
adjustment of zero in the expression for RW and BRW above; or, secondly, an estimate of maturity
implemented by supervisors along the lines proposed for the “advanced” version of the IRB approach.
Many  of  the  requirements  under  the  “advanced”  version  for  banks’  eligibility  for  use  of  their
internal estimates of LGD and EAD are similar to those for estimates of PD under the “foundation”
version, and concern standards to be met by banks’ rating assignments, oversight, internal validation,
disclosure etc. For LGD they also explicitly address estimation difficulties mentioned in section IV.G such
as those due to legal regimes (especially for insolvency) and those of costs resulting from the time
required for recovery. Owing to the greater uncertainty of estimates of LGD and the smaller amount of
available external information capable of serving as benchmarks than for PD, the minimum observation
period for the data to be used in estimating LGD is to be seven years. As in the case of the supervisory
rules under the “foundation” version of the IRB approach, for collateral under LGD the “advanced”
version builds on the “comprehensive” approach to the subject of the standardized approach to credit risk.
However, eligible collateral is no longer limited to specified categories of financial instrument and real
estate, and includes a wider range of types of real collateral. Moreover the recognition of possible sources
of impairment of the collateral’s value does not have to be through the system of “haircuts” described in
section IV.E. Nor is there any floor factor to take account of minimum residual risk exposure. For EAD
too under the “advanced” version of the IRB approach the minimum observation period for data used in
estimation is to be seven years. Banks are to provide their own estimates of EAD for instruments with
uncertain drawdown and for OTC derivatives.
Under the “advanced” version of the IRB approach banks are required to include explicit estimates
of exposures’ M in their RW (and are thus not permitted to use the standard conservative estimate of
three years mentioned earlier). M is defined as the greater of one year or either (i) the maximum
remaining time that a borrower has to discharge his contractual obligations (normally a loan’s nominal
maturity) or (ii) the weighted average of the periods when principal is contractually payable (the weights- 28 -
being the amounts of principal due). Under both the latter definitions M is capped at seven years owing
to research indicating that for M greater than this the method for adjusting RW specified at the beginning
of this section begins to overstate maturity’s impact on the risk of loss.
As already mentioned, estimation of risk-weighted assets for banks and sovereigns follows lines
very  similar  to  those  for  corporates,  one  difference being that PD for sovereigns (which are often
effectively free of credit risk) is not subject to the floor of 0.03 per cent applying to loans to corporates
not covered by a third-party guarantee or credit protection. However, for reasons already discussed in
section IV.G, the proposals of the New Accord for retail, project-finance and equity exposures are still
much less well developed (in the case of the last two categories markedly so).
For retail exposures the principal option for RW proposed in the New Accord is of a form similar
to that for corporates, i.e. the smaller of (LGD/50) x BRWR (PD) or 12.5 x LGD (where the subscript
R  refers  to  retail  exposures).  BRWR  (PD)  is  again  a  product  of  three  factors  as  in  the  case  of  the
corresponding function for corporates but with different values for some of the parameters, so that a given
PD generates a lower BRWR than BRWc. As mentioned in section IV.G, the BCBS is also proposing to
allow  an  estimate  of  RW  for  retail  exposures  which  incorporates  as  an  input  expected  loss,  EL,  as
opposed to its two determinants, PD and LGD, but has yet to decide on a formula for this purpose. One
of the advantages of the IRB approach in the case of retail exposures is the scale and usefulness of
source data on risk and borrower performance available to many banks. In view of this the BCBS does
not differentiate for such exposures between a “foundation” and an “advanced” version, so that here all
eligible banks are required to provide data on LGD and EAD as well as on PD. Thus, for example, eligible
banks are expected to provide their own estimates of EAD for off-balance-sheet items such as unused
commitments with uncertain drawdown. As in the case of corporate exposures, the benchmark average
maturity used to derive the expression for RW is three years. But on the basis of surveys of industry
practice  the  BCBS  has  decided  not  to  include  in  this  expression  an  adjustment factor to allow for
maturities other than three years.
For  project-finance  exposures  the  BCBS  sketches  three  possible  options  for  calculating risk-
weighted assets: the first would be based on banks’ internal estimates of the inputs, PD, LGD and EAD,
but would have to confront difficulties due to the lack of data of a quality comparable to that for retail
exposures and to often higher correlations among the three inputs; the second option would be based on
banks’ own estimates of EL and EAD; and the third option would allow use of both of the first two
(similarly to retail exposures). In the case of project finance, owing to the scale and duration of the
activities involved, an explicit adjustment for M would be required for the estimation of RW. For equity
exposures  in  the  banking  book  the  proposals  in  the  New  Accord  are  still  more  underdeveloped,  the
alternatives proposed being a framework for equity as far as possible analogous to that for corporate debt
or one involving values based on estimates of market risk.- 29 -
29 For a summary of such research findings in the case of United States see Matten (2000: 204–205).
30 The  exclusion  of  retail  exposures  from  the  “granularity  “  adjustment  is  due  to  their  small  size  and  to  mutual
correlations typically lower than for corporate exposures, factors which result in their having at most limited effects
on the “granularity” of banks’ portfolios.
Empirical research on the distribution of a bank’s exposures by rating grade points to a frequent
tendency to clustering in a few (often two or three) of grades.
29 This coarseness or lack of “granularity”,
to use the BCBS’ term, can indicate residual risks due to the concentration of exposures above a
threshold size to borrowers or other counterparties with similar characteristics. As a safeguard against
the underestimation of risk owing to such interdependence the New Accord makes an allowance in the
IRB approach by means of an adjustment applied to all exposures other than retail.
30 Firstly, IRB risk
weights are calibrated for a hypothetical bank with a benchmark level of “granularity” in its exposures.
Then the adjustment is calculated as the difference between indicators of “granularity” for an actual bank
and for the hypothetical one. If the difference is unfavourable to the actual bank, its risk-weighted assets
are increased by the adjustment, but if favourable, they are reduced.
I.  The IRB approach: (3) credit risk mitigation and asset securitization
The rules for the treatment of collateral under the IRB approach are described above in section
IV.H  in  connection  with  LGD. For the other forms of credit risk mitigation, guarantees and credit
derivatives, the treatment in the standardized approach to credit risk and the “foundation” version of the
IRB approach are effectively the same, and in the “advanced” version the basic concepts are also the
same but banks have greater latitude regarding the estimation of risk parameters and eligible guarantors.
Under the supervisory rules for guarantees and credit derivatives in the “foundation” version of the
IRB approach the estimation of the credit protection provided “draws heavily upon the treatment of
guarantees  and  credit  derivatives  in  the  standardized  approach”,  under  which  the  modified  RW is a
weighted average of that of the guarantor or protection provider and of the original obligor (The Internal
Ratings-Based Approach: 16). Indeed, the only difference would appear to concern the range of eligible
guarantors  and  protection  providers,  the  “foundation”  version of the IRB approach including certain
unrated but highly creditworthy companies as well as the sovereign entities, public-sector enterprises,
banks with a lower RW than the underlying obligor, and corporates rated A or better (which are admitted
for this purpose in the standardized approach).
Under the “advanced” version of the IRB approach (described by the BCBS as still provisional in
some respects) the bank would make its own adjustment of its estimate of risk-weighted assets to reflect
the  effect  of  the guarantee or credit derivative. But under this “substitution ceiling” approach the
“notching” of the rating of the exposure would not be allowed to go beyond the better of the grade of the- 30 -
31 Surprisingly  reference  assets  in  the  treatment of guarantees and credit derivatives in  The  Internal  Ratings-
Based  Approach  (p.  17)  are  specified  as  applying  to  both  guarantees  and  credit derivatives, whereas in  The
Standardised Approach to Credit Risk (p. 33–34) they are discussed only as part of the operational requirements
for credit derivatives.
32 In Asset Securitisation (pp. 15–16) the BCBS also addresses the treatment of synthetic securitization, namely
transactions  in  which  credit  derivatives  (sometimes  in  conjunction  with  collateralization)  are  employed  to  shift  credit
risks between banks, SPVs and other investors. The problem here is to devise a treatment of the exposures involved
(in  particular  the  risks  remaining  with  banks) which is consistent with the New Accord’s rules for credit risk
mitigation and asset securitization.
guarantor or protection provider. Thus here too the BCBS is refusing to recognize the “double default
effect”, the term mentioned in section IV.E which covers the possible effect on the risk of an exposure
covered by a guarantee or credit derivative of the low correlation of the risk of simultaneous default by
both obligor and guarantor or provider of credit protection. The same restrictive conditions as in the
standardized  approach  and  the  “foundation”  version  of  the IRB approach apply to recognition of
mismatches  between  underlying  exposures  and  the  reference  assets  used for credit risk mitigation.
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However,  under the “advanced” version of the IRB approach no allowance would be required for the
residual risk of the obligor, and there would be no limits on the range of eligible guarantors (though this
additional flexibility is not specified for the suppliers of credit derivatives).
For  asset  securitization the IRB approach (with no distinction here between “foundation” and
“advanced” versions) follows rules similar to those for the standardized approach (but rules still
considered by the BCBS as requiring further elaboration). For issuing banks retained first-loss positions
would be deducted fully from capital. In the case of banks’ investing in securitized assets, as for the
standardized approach, primary reliance would be placed on the ratings of ECAIs, but here these ratings
would be mapped into banks’ own estimates of PD with the aim of achieving greater risk sensitivity. LGD
is provisionally set at 100 per cent.
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J.  The IRB approach: (4) pro-cyclicality and the costs of international lending
As described in section III.C above, the concerns aroused by the New Framework of 1999 included
its possible effects on the costs of international lending for different countries and the additional impulse
to procyclicality in such lending which might be expected from use of rating agencies’ credit ratings in
setting the risk weights for banks’ exposures. The question naturally arises whether similar concerns are
justified in the case of the fleshed-out IRB approach of the New Accord. As Helmut Reisen of the
OECD Development Centre has pointed out, this question can be addressed tentatively on the basis of
the mapping in the New Accord from default rates (PD) for corporates to corresponding risk weights- 31 -
33 The  mapping  used  by  Reisen  is  an  interpolation estimated from a regression equation based on the
observations for PD and BRWc in The Internal Ratings-Based Approach (table 3, p. 33).
34 A basis point is 0.01 of a rate of interest or rate of return measured in per cent.
35 Under the IRB approach the BCBS does not directly address the issue of incentives to short-term international
(particularly  interbank)  lending.  However,  as  Reisen points out, here also tentative conclusions are possible on the
basis  of  the  mapping  from  PD  to  BRWc.  Data  from  Moody’s  point  to  a  level  for  PD likely to correspond to
significantly  lower  BRWc  and RW than under the 1988 Basel Accord and thus to be translated into lower required
capital.  For  a  given  spread above LIBOR this in turn would increase the “risk adjusted return” and thus also the
incentives associated with such lending.
(BRWc) for loans with the bench-mark maturity of three years and LGD of 50 per cent (Reisen, 2001).
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Since  default  rates  can  in  turn  be  mapped  in  the  credit  ratings  of an agency such as Moody’s, a
correspondence can be established between agency ratings and risk weights. This correspondence is
illustrated in table 2 (which is taken from Reisen’s paper).
As Reisen notes, only 22 of more than 50 non-OECD rated sovereigns have credit ratings of
investment grade (BBB-) or higher, the remaining members of the group being rated as of speculative
grade. One-year default rates for speculative grade issuers in Moody’s Global Database have oscillated
during the last 30 years between 1 per cent in calm periods and 10 per cent in years of crisis. Although
one-year default rates do not correspond to the parameters of the mapping between PD and BRWc in the
New Accord, this experience does point to the likelihood of substantial pro-cyclical shifts in risk weights
for the cross-border borrowing of the majority of developing countries.
In the case of the costs of financing an exercise based on the mapping in table 2 points to declines
for sovereigns with ratings of BBB or higher but sharp increases for those with ratings below investment
grade. In this exercise borrowers with different ratings are assigned different spreads over LIBOR which
are  assumed  to  correspond to “break-even” or normal levels for banks’ lending to the countries in
question. This spread is then divided by the new level of capital corresponding to the risk weights of the
IRB approach to estimate a new “risk adjusted return”. The consequent rise (fall) in the country’s cost
of borrowing (the change in “the break-even spread”) in basis points
34 is then calculated as the decrease
(increase) in the “risk adjusted rate of return” compared with that under the 1988 Basel Accord multiplied
by the assumed level of capital under the New Accord.
For a BBB sovereign the calculation works as follows: the assumed LIBOR spread is 100 basis
points and under the 1988 Accord required capital per $100 of exposure would be $8 and the “risk
adjusted  return”  would  be  1/8  or  12.5  per  cent,  while  under  the  IRB  approach  required capital
(corresponding to a fall in risk weight from 100 to 40) would be only $3.2 per $100 of exposure and the
“risk adjusted return” would rise to 1/3.2, or 31.3 per cent; and the fall in borrowing costs (or in the
“break-even spread”) is then (31.3-12.5) x 3.2 = 60 basis points.
35 For a BB (below-investment-grade)
sovereign, for which the assumed LIBOR spread is 400 basis points, required capital (corresponding to- 32 -
Table 2
Proposed IRB risk weights for hypothetical corporate exposures
with LGD of 50 per cent
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Source: BCBS,  The  Internal  Ratings-Based Approach  (pp.  32–33);  Reisen’s  interpolation;  and  Moody’s
Investors Services as reproduced in Reisen (2001).
a Average three-year  cumulative historical probability of default for corporates during 1980–1998
b Reisen’s calculation of BRWc  by  interpolation  from  a  third-degree  curve  estimated  by  regression  from
the numbers in the mapping from PD to BRWc in BCBS, op. cit. (table 3, p. 33).
a rise in risk weight from 100 to 379) would increase from $8 to $30.3 per $100 of exposure, and the “risk
adjusted return” would fall from 50 per cent to 13.2 per cent, requiring an increase in borrowing costs (or
in the “break-even spread”) of (50 -13.2) x 30.3 = 1115 basis points. The estimated rise in borrowing
costs for a sovereign rated B, for which the assumed LIBOR spread is 700 basis points and the rise in
the risk weight under the IRB approach would be from 100 to 630, would be more than three times that
for the BB sovereign.
As Reisen himself readily acknowledges, his estimates are only indicative of tendencies implicit in
the figures provided by the BCBS and “market spreads are unlikely to react as dramatically” as in his
examples. To the extent that perceptions of risk associated with lending to developing-country sovereigns
with below-investment-grade ratings do not correspond to risk levels associated by market participants- 33 -
36 For a survey of alternative definitions of operational risk see Matten (2000: 208–212).
with the rates of return in the illustrative examples, the rules of the IRB approach could be expected to
lead to extensive recourse to interest-rate arbitrage, which would be likely to involve, inter alia, financial
intermediaries and other parties such as suppliers whose lending would not be covered by the New
Accord. Moreover there would be several avenues under the New Accord itself for lowering the cost
of lending to developing countries. These would include use of collateralization and guarantees. Thus
Reisen’s calculations may point as much to an area in which the New Accord furnishes substantial
incentives to regulatory arbitrage and credit risk mitigation as they do to the likelihood of substantial rises
in borrowing costs for many developing countries. 
K.  Operational risk
Surveys conducted for the BCBS have suggested that quantification of operational risk for the
purpose of capital allocation and risk management is still at a fairly underdeveloped stage in most banks
(Operational Risk, Annex 1), and the 3-option approach of the New Accord is intended to accommodate
this situation. Even the definition of operational risk remains subject to considerable variation. For the
purpose of the New Accord, it is defined as “the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate
or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events”. This elastic definition would
clearly cover the category of “event” risks under the overall heading of operational risks but not
necessarily other categories proposed in some quarters such as “business risks” (which are those due to
strategic errors in decision making).
36 “Event” risks include those due to human error and fraud, the
failure of computer systems, the breakdown of systems of internal control, disruptions of relations with
external suppliers (for example, public utilities and suppliers of other inputs), and natural disasters. The
categories would obviously cover well publicized cases such as the fraudulent trading at Barings and
Daiwa Bank, as well as risks associated with banks’ ongoing adoption of new technology in a growing
number  of  their  activities  and  their  diversification  into  new  areas  such  as  brokerage and insurance.
However, the New Accord excludes strategic or reputational risks in its definition of operational risks for
the purpose of setting a capital charge.
For reasons similar to those in the IRB approach (and discussed in footnote 28) the BCBS intends
its capital charges for operational risk to cover expected as well as unexpected losses, though it proposes
to allow some (still unspecified) recognition for provisioning linked to operational risks. On the basis of a
survey of a sample of banks with methods for determining and allocating capital under this heading the
BCBS attributes a key role to a figure of 20 per cent of minimum regulatory capital in the estimate of
capital charges under two of the three options in the New Accord. - 34 -
Under  the  simplest  of  these  options  banks  would hold capital for operational risk equal to a
percentage  (denoted  alpha)  of  gross  income  (i.e.  net  interest  income and net non-interest income
excluding extraordinary and irregular items but before deductions for operational losses). The provisional
proposal of the New Accord is that alpha should be set at 30 per cent, and the BCBS’s expectation
appears to be that this will lead to levels of capital for operational risk amounting to about 20 per cent of
minimum regulatory capital (Operational Risk: 6).
Under the second option, the standardized approach, banks’ activities are classified, firstly, by
business units (investment banking, banking, and others) and, secondly, under each of these units by
business lines, those specified for banking, for example, being retail banking, commercial banking, and
payments and settlement. For each business unit/business line an indicator (such as annual average assets
for  retail  and commercial banking or annual settlement throughput for payments and settlement) is
specified as a rough proxy for the amount of associated business risk. The capital charge for each
business line is calculated by multiplying the indicator by the capital factor (beta) assigned to it, and the
total capital charge is the sum of regulatory capital charges  for a bank’s different business lines. The
betas are to be set by supervisors but the BCBS provides illustrative guidance as to how they should
proceed. The first step is to estimate the relative weightings or importance of different business lines
within a typical bank’s total activities on the basis of available quantitative information. This weighting is
then combined with information from the sample survey of banks with methods for determining and
allocating capital for operational risk as follows: beta for a given business line is equal to the line’s relative
weighting multiplied by the ratio of 20 per cent of the total current minimum regulatory capital for banks
in the sample to the sum of the values of the financial indicator for the business line for these banks. But
it is not altogether clear how these procedures would be embodied in actual supervisory rules. If the
intention is that national supervisory bodies would estimate the beta on the basis of local data, the result
may be wide international variations in betas. If, on the other hand, the estimates are to be based on data
for a sample of benchmark internationally active banks, guidelines on the way these are to be incorporated
in national supervisory rules will surely be necessary.
While the requirements for eligibility for the standardized approach are more stringent than those
expected of banks using the basic indicator approach, they are still fairly simple and would appear to be
intended to act as an incentive to the establishment of a basic independent management infrastructure for
the  control of operational risk. The requirements for eligibility for the third option, the internal
measurement  approach,  are  altogether  more  demanding  and  include  more  fully  developed  data  and
measurement systems for operational risks and adequate staff with the appropriate skills.
Under the internal measurement approach a bank’s activities are classified into the same business
units/business lines as in the standardized approach. A set of types of operational losses (for example,
write-downs, loss of recourse, restitution, legal liability, regulatory and compliance-related, and loss of or- 35 -
damage to assets) is then applied to each business line and linked to an exposure indicator (EI) (for
example,  volume  of  transactions  for  losses  due  to  write-downs  in  the  case  of  commercial  banking)
specified by the bank’s supervisor. The bank provides internal estimates for each business line/loss type
of the probability of the loss event (PE) and of the loss given that event (LGE). The product of EI, PE
and LGE is then calculated as the expected loss (EL). The supervisor provides the factor (gamma) which
is multiplied by EL to give the capital charge for each business line/loss type. The total capital charge is
the sum of those for different business lines/loss types (subject to a minimum amount of “floor” set in
accordance with supervisory rules). The simple summation reflects the fact that the BCBS does not
believe that measurement and control of operational risks has yet reached a stage of development where
“portfolio effects” reflecting diversification of a bank’s operational risks can be admitted for the purpose
of reducing capital charges.
The BCBS acknowledges that quantification and control of operational risk is a subject where
practice  is  changing  especially  rapidly.  In  particular  it  refers  in  this  context  to  a  more  sophisticated
“internal methodology”, the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA), now being developed, under which, on
the basis of internal estimates of probability distribution functions for each business line/risk type for the
impact  and  frequency  of  loss  events,  the  bank  estimates  the  probability  distribution  of  cumulative
operational loss, capital charges then being set on the basis of losses exceeding a probability threshold.
But the BCBS considers that further development and experience of LDA is necessary before it can be
admitted as an option for supervisory capital requirements.
Unsurprisingly industry concerns are especially wide-ranging in an area where the development
both of its own practices and of supervisory rules is at an early stage. One target of such concerns are
the capital factors, beta under the standardized approach and gamma under the internal measurement
approach, whose levels are capable of substantially affecting the profitability of different business lines.
Another is disclosure (a subject already touched on in section IV.C). Here the BCBS recommends that
“banks should publicly, and in a timely fashion, disclose detailed information about the process used to
manage and control their operational risks and the regulatory capital allocation they use”; and puts
forward the suggestion that “in the longer term such disclosures will form part of the qualifying criteria
to use internal approaches” (ibid.: 4). A problem here is that the very rapidity of the development of
techniques for measuring and controlling operational risks renders them a potential source of competitive
advantage for banks with the result that this is an area for possible disagreements as to the respective
weights to be given to transparency, on the one hand, and legitimate demands for the right not to disclose
certain proprietary information, on the other.- 36 -
37 Henry Kaufman has usefully summarized such valuation difficulties as follows: “Alongside the development
of securitization, there has been a rapid expansion in the practice of marking to market. … Even so, it is important
to  recognize  that  marking  to  market is an imperfect process, especially under difficult market conditions. Generally
speaking, it tends to  overstate  values  and  to  offer  investors  a  kind  of  false  comfort.  When  market  conditions
deteriorate  and  liquidity  seizes  up,  no  one  can  really  claim  that  the  last  quoted  price  in  organized  markets  (such  as
the NYSE) or quoted by dealers in the over-the-counter market is the real market value – at least not without taking
into  consideration  the  size  of  an  intended  trade,  the  credit  quality  of  the  issuer,  the  activity  of  other  market
participants, and related dimensions of the transaction” (Kaufman, 2000: 316–317).
L.  The definition and valuation of items in the trading book
The New Accord contains a section on “Trading Book Issues” which covers definitional matters,
guidance on valuation, and revisions to the provisions of the 1996 Amendment to the Capital Accord to
Incorporate Market Risks covering capital charges for specific risks associated with certain financial
instruments. Elaborating the definition of the trading book is presumably, inter alia, intended to help in
preventing regulatory arbitrage through the shifting of items between the banking and trading books and
in helping supervisors in the assignment of new financial instruments such as credit derivatives to one or
the other (both issues mentioned in section II). The guidance on valuation is presumably a response to the
growing importance to banks of traded assets for which liquidity can be drastically reduced, on occasion
to the point of virtual disappearance in disorderly markets. In such situations difficulties regarding the
valuation of traders’ positions can contribute to market panic.
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The revised definition of the trading book fleshes out the meaning of “the trading intent” associated
with items belonging to it by specifying policies and procedures acceptable as evidence of such intent. The
definition of a hedge is elaborated to “a position that materially or entirely offsets the component risk
elements of another trading book position or a set of positions” (The New Basel Capital Accord: 100).
In the 1996 Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks the rule is that all
items should be marked to market for the purpose of measuring market risk (BCBS, 1996, para. 5). Under
the New Accord this procedure is still to be followed “as much as possible”, but when this is not feasible,
“banks may mark to model”, this procedure being defined “as any valuation which has to be benchmarked,
extrapolated or otherwise calculated from a market input”. Recourse to marking to model has “to be
demonstrated to be prudent”, and supervisors are directed to consider the fulfilment of a number of
requirements in deciding whether this condition is met, in particular regarding the validation of the models
used as well as the awareness of a bank’s senior management of the items subject to marking to model
and of the materiality of the uncertainty thus created in the reporting of risk and performance (The New
Basel Capital Accord: 100–101). Explicit regulatory recognition of valuation problems usefully draws
attention to a subject closely related to possible fault-lines in financial markets during episodes of financial- 37 -
38 To  quote  Henry  Kaufman  again:  “Mathematics  and  the computer technology that permits financial market
participants to exploit its power have a dark side. … What we all know now is that historical trading patterns are a
useful  starting  point  for  assessing  risk,  but only a starting point. Most instances of sudden deterioration in credit
standing  of  a  corporate  or  government  borrower  are  not  predictable. They reflect submerged weaknesses in
underlying  economic  or  financial structures that are not captured by the available data. Models are basically
backward  looking  and  are  essentially  useless  when  the  underlying  structure  changes.  One  of  the  key  structural
changes is the loss of liquidity. In the case of managing elaborate positions of options and other complex financial
derivatives,  models  that  provide  good  formulas  for  conducting  dynamic  hedging  under  normal circumstances are
of no assistance when transactions cannot be made without huge price concessions” (Kaufman, 2000: 316–317).
39 The need to include “within” as well as “between” here can be illustrated from the case of the United States
where only about 20 out of 9000 banks have the set of characteristics necessary for their characterization as “large,
complex and internationally active”. The remainder vary between banks of medium size and community banks
(Meyer, 2001).
instability but has nonetheless to confront limitations on the likely effectiveness of guidance due to human
understanding and the state of the art as to measurement and modelling.
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V.  CONTINUING CONCERNS
The documents setting out The New Basel Capital Accord are impressive in the scope of their
coverage despite the still provisional or unfinished character of parts of the blueprint. Yet the proposals
also raise several concerns, not all of which will be easy to address within the present framework of the
proposals. One set of concerns relates to the New Accord’s impact on supervisory divergences among
countries,  cross-border competition between banks, and cooperation between national supervisors.
Another potential source of problems for global financial governance is the relation of the New Accord
to ongoing exercises involving codes and standards. And a further set of issues involve the possible
effects of the New Accord on banking operations, in particular on regulatory arbitrage (the reduction of
which is one of the targets of the whole exercise) and on economic activity and international capital flows.
As noted in sections I and III, the BCBS now finds itself in the role of global standard setter for
banks. In consequence the proposals of the New Accord have been crafted to accommodate banks of
very different levels of sophistication. Yet the effort to achieve this aim may compromise in ways difficult
to  predict  the  New  Accord’s  basic objective of enhancing competitive equality by actually creating
regulatory  divergences  in  some  areas  of  banking  practice  and  both  within  and  between different
countries.
39 To the extent that the outcome is a multi-track regime for prudential capital internationally,
characterized by significant differences among countries in the sophistication of supervision, the difficulties
of  achieving  effective  cross-border  cooperation amongst supervisors are likely to increase. These
difficulties are capable of spilling over into areas for supervisory cooperation other than prudential capital
requirements such as information sharing and mutual recognition of regulatory standards.- 38 -
40 For  a  survey  of  the  themes  of  these  key  standards  and  issues  regarding their implementation, see UNCTAD
(2001, Part Two, chap. IV).
41 As stated in Overview of The New Basel Capital Accord (p. 7), “The Accord should focus on internationally
active  banks,  although  its  underlying  principles should be suitable for application to banks of varying levels of
complexity and sophistication”.
42 In  conversation  with  the  author  one  senior  risk  manager, after quoting Chris Matten on the creation of “ a
cottage  industry  in  regulatory  capital  arbitrage”  in  response  to  the  1988  Basel  Capital  Accord  (Matten, 2000: 90),
expressed  the view that the New Accord risked being the source of “an industrial revolution in regulatory capital
arbitrage”.
As  noted  in  section  IV.B,  the  New  Accord  poses  new  problems  in  the  context of the
implementation of key standards for financial systems, a major component of international initiatives to
strengthen the so-called international financial architecture.
40 In the case of banking the key standard is
the  BCBS’s  Core  Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. Under the heading of “development
and implementation of prudential regulations and requirements” these Principles include the setting of
“prudent  and  appropriate  minimum  capital  adequacy  requirements  for  all  banks” which “at least for
internationally active banks … must not be less than those established in the Basle Capital Accord and
its  amendments”  (BCBS,  1997,  sect.  IV.B.I). In practice the New Accord is likely to provide the
framework for setting levels of capital adequacy for all banks
41, and in this role to have an integral
connection to key standards for financial systems. Attention was drawn in section IV.B to the resulting
administrative  burden  for  developing  countries:  not  only  will  supervisors  in  these  countries  face  a
substantial increase in the complexity of their primary responsibilities as a result of the New Accord but
they will also have to cope with the additional administrative burden due to its incorporation in assessment
exercises  regarding  compliance  with  the  key  standards.  As  also  mentioned  in  section  IV.B,  the link
between the New Accord and key standards for financial systems also implies that implementation will
become a subject for IMF Article IV surveillance and part of the conditionality associated with the IMF’s
new CCL facility.
A  major  objective  of  the  exercise  leading  to  the  New  Accord is the reduction of regulatory
arbitrage due to banks’ pursuit of economic incentives within a framework of regulatory rules, which leads
to outcomes at variance with the framework’s objectives. However, the very comprehensiveness and
detailed character of the rules of the New Accord will almost inevitably be a source of new opportunities
for regulatory arbitrage (some of which were mentioned above, for example, in the discussion in section
IV.J of the New Accord’s effects on the cost of lending to developing countries). It is difficult to visualize
how this could be avoided, but regulatory arbitrage is likely in future to be a source of continuing pressures
for further amendments to the New Accord.
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As mentioned in section IV.J, the proposed risk weights of the IRB approach are capable of leading
to substantial rises in interest rates for lending to borrowers with low credit ratings both within countries- 39 -
43 For  a  comprehensive account of accounting for loan losses and its relation to regulatory capital and
provisioning,  see  Beattie  et  al.  (1995).  This  source  contains a wealth of information on industrial countries’
regulatory  and  tax  policies  towards banks’ provisions, exemplifying the international differences to which the BCBS
refers (see below).
44 It  will  be  recalled  that  under  Pillar 2 of the New Accord supervisors should expect banks to maintain their
capital at levels above regulatory minima.
45 Although the distinction can be blurred in practice, specific provisions refer to those associated with particular
loans  or  pools  of  loans,  while  general  provisions  are those based on estimated expected future loan losses for a
whole portfolio. The character of the loan analysis used to make this distinction is described in Beattie et al. (1995:
21–25).
46 Somewhat  disconcertingly  the  book  cited  in  the  previous  footnote  provides  evidence for the United Kingdom
in the late 1980s and early 1990s that banks’ provisioning was actually reactive, general provisions increasing during
a period of poor loan performance (Beattie et al., 1995: 111–114).
and internationally – an issue of concern to several developing countries. While the effects may not be
as drastic as in the hypothetical examples given owing to regulatory arbitrage and credit risk mitigation,
they could impose what may be regarded as excessively restrictive limits on the access to international
borrowing of certain countries. As a result consideration may need to be given to ceilings for risk weights
even under the IRB approach.
More generally, owing to their links to the ratings of credit rating agencies and to observed default
rates, the risk weights proposed in the New Accord are capable of contributing to the pro-cyclical
character of bank lending both within countries and across borders. Lending cycles connected to pro-
cyclical credit risk are a long-standing feature of business cycles and of economic instability, and the
danger on the regulatory front comes from prudential rules which translate higher credit risks in more
difficult times into increased capital requirements (and thus more restrictive lending policies). Prudential
rules  which  would  minimize  such  dangers  can  be  sketched  but  would nonetheless be difficult to
incorporate in the actual design of regulatory systems.
An approach to this problem, which might almost be characterized as a biblical injunction, would
be based on the principal of setting aside reserves in good times to meet the exigencies of harder ones.
In practice this approach might involve various alternatives.
43 Under one alternative supervisors might
prescribe average levels of capital for banks significantly in excess of minimum levels, insisting on higher
levels during periods of buoyant economic activity and bank profits and permitting lower levels in
recession.
44 Another alternative would be to establish guidelines for the appropriate level of banks’
general provisions
45 which would include provisions designed to cushion the impact of macroeconomic
fluctuations.
46 It is possible to visualize supervisory guidelines intended to achieve in a rough-and-ready
way the objective of the first alternative, though the difficulty would have to be confronted that the
duration and intensity of economic fluctuations are hard to forecast so that the setting of appropriate
variable levels of capital would also be only approximate. The alternative of including an allowance in- 40 -
general provisions for the effect of changes in macroeconomic conditions would face the same problem.
But this alternative also has the potential to provoke a more fundamental rethinking of the rationale and
design of prudential capital requirements in this area by reopening questions concerning the appropriate
relations between capital and provisioning, on the one hand, and expected and unexpected loan losses, on
the other. As noted earlier, the approach of the BCBS, to a significant extent dictated by the diversity of
national legal regimes concerning provisioning for loan losses, is to aggregate expected and unexpected
losses under the headings of credit and operational risks for the purpose of setting capital requirements
(capital here being permitted to include general reserves up to a certain ceiling). Eventual modification
of this approach can be envisaged in principle, though the associated practical problems should be evident
from the discussion above, and one reason might be an eventually perceived need to mitigate the
procyclical effects of variations in banks’ capital requirements.- 41 -
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